Bush has said he will veto the Iraq war funding bill. You know, the one that contains voluntary timetables for withdrawal. He calls the timetables "artificial."
Okay, try this exercise, if you dare: imagine a natural timetable in Iraq. Imagine a situation where the US government and the military leaders all look around Iraq and say, "By jiggy, it looks like our work here is done."
Imagine how long it would take to get to a place like that.
Now, go change your underwear.
43 has also postulated that, by imposing their own timetables, the Democrats are not listening to the leadership on the ground in Iraq.
The new leadership, that is. Not the old leadership. Christ, don't listen to them. The old leadership got shit-canned. I think because they sucked.
Yeah, I know, and that was by BushCo standards, even. That's pretty goddamn sucky, don't you think?
Where was I?
Oh, yeah. So, here's a little bit of wisdom from some of the fabled leadership on the ground in Iraq, Lt. Colonel Paul Yingling:
These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.What do you think? Will we listen to this guy on the ground? After all, he is a deputy commander of the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment who's served two tours in Iraq.
What's that you're saying, sir? You have more?
After failing to visualize the conditions of combat in Iraq, America's generals failed to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency theory prescribes providing continuous security to the population. However, for most of the war American forces in Iraq have been concentrated on large forward-operating bases, isolated from the Iraqi people and focused on capturing or killing insurgents. Counterinsurgency theory requires strengthening the capability of host-nation institutions to provide security and other essential services to the population. America's generals treated efforts to create transition teams to develop local security forces and provincial reconstruction teams to improve essential services as afterthoughts, never providing the quantity or quality of personnel necessary for success.Wow, sir, I am definitely listening to you. Is there anything we can do?
Amazing stuff. I'll bet everyone is listening to this guy.
To reward moral courage in our general officers, Congress must ask hard questions about the means and ways for war as part of its oversight responsibility. Some of the answers will be shocking, which is perhaps why Congress has not asked and the generals have not told. Congress must ask for a candid assessment of the money and manpower required over the next generation to prevail in the Long War. The money required to prevail may place fiscal constraints on popular domestic priorities. The quantity and quality of manpower required may call into question the viability of the all-volunteer military. Congress must re-examine the allocation of existing resources, and demand that procurement priorities reflect the most likely threats we will face. Congress must be equally rigorous in ensuring that the ways of war contribute to conflict termination consistent with the aims of national policy. If our operations produce more enemies than they defeat, no amount of force is sufficient to prevail.
Or not. Apparently an Army spokesman has already dismissed the Lt. Colonel by stressing that he is expressing his "personal opinions," and that the military is focused on "executing the mission at hand."
That's exactly what I'm afraid of.